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This paper questions whether the contemporary science of economics and its recommendations are built 
on sound moral foundations as assessed from a virtue-based definition of ethical behaviour. We argue 
that the model of man underlying economic analyses can correspond to the model of a virtuous person, 
and that economics, by advocating reasoned choice and careful resource utilization, makes a positive 
contribution to the moral development of individuals. 
 







L'article propose une analyse critique des fondements éthiques de la théorie économique contemporaine, 
en adoptant comme perspective l'éthique des vertus. 
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Despite the apparent unsuitability of utilitarian ethics to guide appropriate human behaviour 
through the labyrinth of real-life situations, economics – defined as the science of efficient 
resource allocation – is often evaluated in the light of this outdated ethical perspective. This 
paper takes a different point of view: it questions whether the contemporary science of 
economics and its recommendations are built on sound moral foundations as assessed from a 
virtue-based definition of ethical behaviour. We argue that the model of man underlying 
economic analyses can correspond to the model of a virtuous person, and that economics, by 
advocating reasoned choice and careful resource utilization, makes a positive contribution to 
the moral development of individuals. 
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It is sometimes said that economists regard it as “natural” or “normal”, and in 
some sense even right, that man should be governed only by selfish motives; 
this opinion may however be dismissed at once as a popular error, which finds 
no support in the teaching or practice of the best economists. (Alfred Marshall, 




As pointed out years ago by John Maynard Keynes, the influence of economics on the global 
ideology of capitalism should not be underestimated.
1 Economics, like any other social 
science, is built on moral foundations which shape its development, guide researchers’ choice 
of topics, and structure their recommendations. The main goal of this paper is to present some 
inquiries into the moral foundations of economics, with special focus on the recent 
developments in this field. As the analysis takes a virtue-based ethical perspective, the main 
question addressed here is whether the economic model of man is consistent with the model 
of a virtuous person. 
Broadly speaking economics studies how society produces and delivers goods to its 
members. Over time several paradigms struggled to provide a rigorous explanation for this 
process of resource allocation. In this text we will stick to the perspective provided by what is 
known as the neoclassical school of thought, which has been the dominant paradigm for over 
a century. From this standpoint, ‘economics is the study of how societies use scarce resources 
to produce valuable commodities and distribute them among different people’ (Samuelson 
and Nordhaus, 1998: 4). The tension between the scarcity of resources and the limitlessness of 
needs thus lies at the heart of neoclassical economic theory. This tension is an overwhelming 
fact of life. In many developing areas of the planet, basic human needs (food, housing, public 
health, etc) are still unsatisfied. In the developed countries that no longer suffer such 
deficiencies, the supply of more sophisticated products is still rationed. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to provide an analysis of the other paradigms, which occupy only a small part of 
the contemporary landscape. In the rest of this paper, the term ‘economics’ actually refers to 
neoclassical economics. 
                                                 
1 He wrote: “…the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are 
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, 
who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slave of some 
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some 
academic scribbler of a few years back.” (Keynes, 1936: 383).   3
In the neoclassical paradigm, economics is a theory of human actions undertaken by 
intelligent people, who understand the world they live in, can evaluate their options, and are 
able to decide wisely. As a study of human interaction, economics focuses on voluntary 
agreements or trades between individuals. This perspective was reinforced after the collapse 
of socially planned economies and the communist ideology in the late 1980s, and free 
allocation of resources through voluntary exchange became the dominant economic model 
throughout the world. 
As Thomas Kuhn argued, a scientific paradigm needs one set of axioms on which the 
specific constructs of the field are developed. One important principle of neoclassical 
economics is methodological individualism: the key element of the social nexus is the 
individual, and society must have the characteristics of its member individuals, rather than the 
reverse. Another distinctive principle is that of rationality: the human being is assumed to 
make use of reason in evaluating the various courses of action open to him, and choose the 
best. While economics focuses on reason-driven choices, it does not deny that sentiments and 
instincts can also be major drivers of human action. Yet what economists believe - and 
hopefully they are right - is that reason plays an important role in a substantial number of 
human actions. The emphasis on rational behaviour drove economics towards what 
Williamson (1993) called ‘calculativeness’, a concept that he does not define explicitly, but 
from his examples appears to be characterized by a strong focus on analytical thinking, 
formalism, measurement, etc. A third essential principle is that of predetermined tastes. 
Economics takes human goals (tastes) as given, and, in general, would not make any value 
judgement about those tastes. However, economists also agree that ethical principles guide 
human actions at the higher level, helping individuals to define their higher goals. The 
economist, that theoretician of the ‘dismal science’, is first and foremost a human being: he 
can only agree that human values such as honesty, fairness, fellow-feeling, kindness, and so 
on must be taught and instilled in a civilized society. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the basic principles of 
economics, then sketches an outline of the main contemporary developments. Section 3 
introduces the ethical perspective of this paper. Section 4 comments on the concept of 
rationality in contemporary economics and presents its ethical foundations. We analyse the 
ethical implications of the quest for efficiency in Section 5. Section 6 addresses the 
paradigmatic frontier of taste predetermination from an ethical perspective. The final section 
presents the conclusion. 
   4
2. What is economics today? 
2.1. Economics in historical perspective 
 
For many years, the main quest of positive economics was to find an explanation for the 
determination of prices in free-market economies. A milestone was reached with the analysis 
of an individual market by Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). He showed how the market price of 
a given commodity can be found at the intersection between an upwardly sloping supply 
curve characteristic of producers’ decisions, and a downwardly sloping demand curve 
characteristic of consumers’ tastes. In this framework, single market equilibrium or partial 
equilibrium is defined as a situation where the optimal plans of all agents in the market are 
mutually compatible. 
As supply and demand in a market naturally depend on the prices of other goods, it 
makes sense to analyse the simultaneous equilibrium in all markets: this is the concept of 
general equilibrium. In 1776, in his famous treaty An Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, Adam Smith claimed that a decentralized economy, where each economic agent 
pursues his own interest, can achieve a highly efficient allocation of resources, as if an 
‘invisible hand’ carries resources to the place where they are the most highly valued. This 
powerful allocative efficiency is the key to prosperity for society as a whole. The facts have 
corroborated this intuition, in that over more than two hundred years Western economies grew 
extremely rapidly, while the same period has seen the birth and collapse of all planned 
economies. Yet it took years for economics to provide a convincing explanation for this 
seemingly puzzling situation. In the late 19
th century, Léon Walras expressed the problem of 
resource allocation via the market mechanism in a rigorously mathematical form, providing 
intuition for the solution finally worked out in 1956 by Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu. 
Their analysis highlighted the restrictions needed to guarantee the existence of the general (or 
Walrassian) equilibrium, a set of prices consistent with the simultaneous equilibrium of all 
markets. The set of restrictions required by the general equilibrium is referred to as perfect 
competition. It was demonstrated that under these restrictions the equilibrium (a) is single and 
(b) allows for extremely efficient allocation of resources. 
This understanding of a hypothetical, perfectly competitive free-market economy led 
to valuable policy recommendations. Economists observed how real-life economies (or 
industrial sectors) deviated from the competitive model, and calculated the welfare losses that 
come with firms’ excessive market power or various externalities. Following their analyses,   5
governments all over the world set up laws and institutions designed to contain market 
concentration, limit abuses of market power by big firms and promote competition between 
firms.
2 
Contemporary economic theory continues to pay great attention to these inefficiencies, 
which originate in the market architecture. Yet in the last thirty years, a new path of research 
tracking ‘informational inefficiencies’ has provided a catalyst for renewal of economics 
through an ambitious research programme. 
 
2.2. Contemporary advances in economics 
 
As early as 1961 George Stigler pointed out that the production of information in 
decentralized economies is a critical process that deserves close scrutiny
3, and tried to model 
the mechanism whereby people spend time and effort to find out the characteristics of a given 
commodity (price, quality, location, and so on). The studies carried out in this field showed 
that even very small informational costs may put at risk the allocative efficiency of 
decentralized economies as imagined by proponents of the spontaneous emergence of the 
Walrassian general equilibrium.
4 Although this path of research came to a standstill in the late 
1980s, it very clearly indicated the need for economics to incorporate a more rigorous analysis 
of imperfect information, a fundamental characteristic of real-life economic systems. The 
analysis of ‘imperfect information’ required a new approach to ‘expectations’, since people 
who decide on the basis of imperfect knowledge of reality must base their choices on their 
subjective perception of that reality. 
Making extensive use of the concept of equilibrium specific to Game Theory
5 and 
importing elements from statistics and probability, in the 1970s economists developed the 
New Theory of Expectations, built around the key concept of the rational expectation 
                                                 
2 Economics advocates competition between firms, and not, as is sometimes claimed by uninformed critics, 
between individuals. 
3 Before Stigler, Friedrich Hayek also emphasized the role of market interactions as an efficient way of 
producing and conveying information. 
4 Diamond (1971) produced a fundamental paper in this field. He shows that by introducing a small search cost 
into a seemingly competitive economy, firms become able to impose the abnormally high monopsony price on 
consumers. 
5 Game theory analyzes individual strategic choices in view of the reaction of competitors. In a game theoretical 
framework, equilibrium is often seen as a situation of no regret. In equilibrium, the individual has no incentive to 
deviate, and would not regret his past choices.   6
equilibrium.
6 The basic idea was that over a long period, intelligent individuals should be able 
to eliminate all systematic biases from their perceptions. They may still be unsettled by 
exceptional events: indeed, random shocks are an intrinsic feature of real-life economies 
(tastes, technology, terms of trade, etc. do often change in unpredictable ways). Proponents of 
the rational expectation principle acknowledge that individuals are moving in an uncertain 
environment, but argue that they are not fully ignorant of the world they live in: they will 
utilize all the available information in order to reduce expectation errors as far as possible. 
Given these developments, economic equilibrium (that is, the rational expectation 
equilibrium) was reinterpreted as a situation where individuals’ actions and individuals’ 
beliefs are mutually consistent. This is not just a cosmetic change: in contrast to the 
Walrassian equilibrium, these types of economic equilibria are not necessarily single. The 
economists’ understanding of expectation-based systems with multiple equilibria (where, to 
put it simply, there is an equal chance of either a good or a bad situation occurring) allowed 
them to provide relevant explanations for notorious episodes of economic instability. For 
instance, the financial crises that hit emerging economies in the 1990s could be explained by 
emphasizing how the loss of trust had exaggerated the true scale of economic difficulties, with 
the resulting downturn confirming such pessimistic beliefs. 
The new theory of expectations revealed its full potential in analysis of asymmetric 
information situations, where one of the participants in a trade has more information than the 
other. Economists have shown that in such situations, which are quite common in real life, the 
better-informed agent can set up information manipulation strategies with the aim of 
extracting an informational rent from the less-informed agent. These attempts to manipulate 
information strategically can lead to significant dysfunctions in a decentralized economy. 
All in all, the concepts of rational expectations and the rational expectation 
equilibrium endowed economics with a method for analysing the formation of beliefs. This 
more nuanced understanding of the interaction between actions and beliefs in turn 
strengthened the internal consistency of existing economic analyses, and encouraged 
development of new approaches. The new emphasis on beliefs and interactions fostered 
development of more complex models of human decision making, which even when they do 
not incorporate an explicit ethical dimension have the merit of acknowledging that 
                                                 
6 The new principles were first applied in the work of macroeconomists as Robert Lucas, Robert Barro, Edward 
Prescott, Finn Kydland, Thomas Sargent, etc. or microeconomists as Joseph Stiglitz, Bruce Greenwald, George 
Akerlof, Michael Spence, etc.   7
individuals’ economic choices are subject to a wider set of constraints than is assumed in 
standard analysis of the Walrassian equilibrium. 
 
3. Choosing the appropriate ethical perspective 
 
Everyone would agree that, in the realm of philosophy, ethical issues provide for the most 
controversial topic. Textbooks often state three main approaches to morality that compete on 
some dimensions and are mutually complementary on others: utilitarian ethics (emphasising 
consequences), teleological ethics (emphasising goals) and virtue ethics (emphasising 
character).  
There is a tendency for social science scholars to evaluate economics within the 
paradigm of utilitarian ethics. In a nutshell, the utilitarian moralist would argue that an action 
(or rule of action) is right if it brings about the greatest balance of pleasure over pain for 
everyone.
7 What ultimately matters are the consequences of an action: right actions are 
presumed to bring about pleasure, and wrong actions pain. Although there is nothing to 
prevent the utilitarian thinker from connecting pleasures to the achievement of higher human 
goals, this perspective has little to say about how these higher human goals emerge. Yet if we 
go back to Socrates, ethics is primarily about ‘how one should live’. The emergence and 
definition of these higher human goals is thus a key question for the moralist. Even John 
Stuart Mill, a famous proponent of utilitarian ethics, appeared to accept this criticism: 
 
If no more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians look on the morality of 
actions, as measured by the utilitarian standard, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay 
sufficient stress upon the other beauties of character which go towards making a human being 
lovable or admirable, this may be admitted. (Mill, 1863, Ch. 2) 
 
I will not argue further here on why utilitarian ethics suffers from too many 
shortcomings to be seriously considered as a suitable moral theory. But are the moral 
foundations of economics utilitarian? I believe they are not. 
Economists agree that when it comes to satisfying basic needs, the individual’s actions 
are indeed guided by an assessment of costs and benefits (or pains and pleasures in the old-
                                                 
7 It should be emphasised here that many utilitarian philosophers give a much more nuanced account of what 
should be understood by pleasure, pain and utility than Jeremy Bentham (see Mill, 1863). See also Solomon 
(1993), Chapter 9 on Mill’s broad conception of utilitarianism.   8
fashioned vocabulary). But this is not the same as saying that all human actions should in fact 
be driven by utilitarian considerations. Few contemporary scholars in economics would deny 
that ultimate human goals may go far beyond the simple goal of wealth accumulation. The 
point was clearly made by Stanley Jevons, one of the fathers of neoclassical economics: 
 
The calculus of utility aims at supplying the ordinary wants of man at the least cost of labour. 
Each labourer, in the absence of other motives, is supposed to devote his energy to the 
accumulation of wealth. A higher calculus of moral right and wrong would be needed to show 
how he may best employ that wealth for the good of others well as himself. But when that 
higher calculus gives no prohibition, we need the lower calculus to gain us the utmost good in 
matters of moral indifference. (Jevons, 1871: 27) 
 
In no way does the logic of utilitarian decision-making as a theory of individual choice 
imply that modern, neoclassical economics actually advocates utilitarian ethics. 
Microeconomic theory defines the individual’s preferences in an axiomatic way, given 
the set of choices and his ability to rank outcomes from the most to the least desirable. A 
utility function is a compact way of representing the individual’s preferred ordering, a tool 
that gives up some generality for the sake of analytical simplicity. Yet microeconomics does 
not assign any role to the level of utility associated with a given consumption bundle, but only 
to the ability to rank consumption bundles as representative of the individual’s ability to make 
choices. 
True, one branch of theoretical microeconomics, welfare economics (Bergson, 1938; 
Samuelson, 1947), aimed to provide a formal analysis of distributional justice, and tried based 
on social justice criteria to build a social welfare function (SWF), a utility function 
representative of society’s preferences. Note that such a construct could be made consistent 
with various degrees of inequality aversion, going from the extreme principle that social 
decisions must aim at improving the situation of the worst-off individual (Rawls, 1971), to 
pure Benthamite utilitarianism where all individuals are given equal weight. In recent years, 
this static approach has been generalized to take into account the fact that status can change 
along an individual’s entire life, so problems of utility inequality are placed in a dynamic 
perspective (what matters for an individual and society as a whole is not only instant equality 
but the probability of individuals improving their position over time).
8 
                                                 
8 Not all the existing theories of distributional justice are consistent with a formalized SWF. For instance, Nozick 
(1974) argues that the market economy is just because it rewards the most able and the hard worker.   9
Yet the validity of the concept of a social welfare function has never been fully 
established. First of all, all these functions involve explicit or implicit interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, a principle that could never receive empirical or theoretical support.
9 
Further scepticism on the meaningfulness of social welfare functions was contributed by 
Arrow (1950) who proved that given a few almost common-sense restrictions, it is 
mathematically impossible to determine a democratic procedure able to aggregate individual 
preferences so that the preferred ordering of alternatives is respected for all individuals; in 
other words, given alternatives {x, y, z, w,…}, if all individuals prefer x to y, (but do not all 
prefer x to z or w) there is no social choice mechanism involving that x is clearly preferred 
over y.
10 
When it comes to welfare analysis, studies out of the field of welfare economics 
generally take the most elementary stance and resort to a elementary utilitarian social welfare 
function. But, in all these papers the main focus is on efficiency, or how to obtain the best 
allocation of resources. The choice of a utilitarian SWF is probably driven by parsimony 
rather than a strong belief in the positive virtues of this construct. When social choice is 
brought into the picture, economists very often become cautious in their recommendations, 
since they do not trust simple SWFs, have no idea of what the actual SWF might be, and 
doubt that the actual social decision process can be captured by any SWF. 
To sum up, economics aims at removing inefficiencies, which is quite straightforward 
in situations where economic advice can improve the situation of at least one person without 
harming everyone else. When policy choices involve trade-offs, economists can point out the 
consequences for various groups, but will be cautious about advocating one solution, even 
though they can agree that choices involving social trade-offs should build on higher ethical 
values. This does not imply that economists, as members of society, do not have a personal 
position with respect to ethics. Taking a random sample of studies from a large database in 
economics (such as EconLit), we see that economists tend to follow the Rawlsian, rather than 
Benthamite, distributional principle: they will on the whole advocate decisions that protect the 
least favoured group of people (the unemployed rather than employers or insiders; consumers 
                                                 
9 Long ago, Stanley Jevons (1888, I20) wrote: ‘The reader will find, again, that there is never, in any single 
instance, an attempt made to compare the amount of feeling in one mind with that in another. I see no means by 
which such comparison can be accomplished. The susceptibility of one mind may, for what we know, be a 
thousand times greater than that of another.’ 
10 There must be more than two alternatives. One important restriction is that social preferences between any two 
alternatives depend only on the individual preferences between the same two alternatives (independence of 
irrelevant alternatives).   10
rather than large firms; small competitive firms rather than the monopoly; developing 
countries rather than developed countries, and so on). 
If the foundations of contemporary economics are not utilitarian, are they then virtue-
based? Virtue ethics places full emphasis on character; it acknowledges that outcomes and 
actions cannot be dissociated from the person him/herself. The origin of this approach can be 
traced back to Aristotle (384-322 BC) who, in his Nicomanchean Ethics, argued that since 
virtuous people can take only good action, ethics is primarily about defining virtues, those 
traits of character which allow the person to respond appropriately to the situation. In general, 
a virtue is characterized by moderation; the same trait of character pushed to extremes 
becomes a vice. (For instance, courage is a virtue, while cowardice and temerity are both 
vices.)
 11 
Over the years, many lists of significant virtues have been drawn up by various 
thinkers, from Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas to Jane Austen. In the realm of economic 
life, certain virtues come under the spotlight. Solomon (1993) argues that in modern market 
economies, basic business virtues are honesty, fairness, trust and toughness which should be 
accompanied by friendliness, honour, loyalty, a sense of shame, competition, care and 
compassion. 
What should be emphasised here is that the virtuous person will be educated in and 
cultivate all virtues (honesty, for example, may require courage and helps develop fairness, 
and so on), while it is enough to give way to a single vice to become a bad person. 
The main thesis developed in this paper is that economics trains people to oppose 
several vices, in particular silliness (unreasoned actions) and prodigality (wasteful spending 
of resources). No economic analysis would advise people to steal, lie or manipulate others in 
order to get rich. On the contrary, since contemporary economics is above all an inquiry into 
voluntary exchange, it will quite naturally call for transparency, honesty and loyalty in future 
trades. There is no guarantee that behaving in keeping with the principles of economics is 
sufficient to become a good person, but ignoring those principles raises the chances of 
behaving wrongly. 
                                                 
11 Philosophy’s interest in Aristotle’s view of ethics is rather recent compared to the established utilitarian and 
deontological ethical perspectives. Special credit should be assigned to the work of Anscombe (1958) and 
MacIntyre (1981). These scholars pointed out that the quest of both utilitarian and deontological theorists for 
universal rules of action might be void, since no rule can be consistent with the huge variety of real-life 
situations. Several scholars have argued that virtue ethics might provide the most suitable lens for analysing 
ethical issues pertaining to business situations, since it is able to strike a subtle balance between determinism (the 
external constraints on the individual’s behaviour) and human character (Koehn, 1995; Murphy, 1999; Solomon, 
1992, 2003).   11
 
4. Ethics and the principle of rationality 
4.1. Reason as a virtue 
The Greek philosophers taught us that what distinguishes humans from animals, and thus 
defines the human species, is rationality. In his comprehensive analysis of rationality, Robert 
Nozick states: 
 Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud taught us that human beings do not occupy a special place in 
the universe, they are not special in their origin and are not always guided by rational or even 
consciously known motives. What continued to give humanity some special status, though, is 
its capacity for rationality. Perhaps we do not consistently exercise this valuable attribute; yet 
it set us apart. Rationality provides us with the (potential) power to investigate and discover 
anything and everything; it enables us to control and direct our behaviour through reason and 
the utilization of principles. (Nozick, 1993: 1P). 
 
We also know that in Aristotle’s view, acting with reason is a fundamental virtue. He 
wrote:  
 
For the good man judges in every instance correctly, and in every instance the notion 
conveyed to his mind is the true one. (Aristotle, Nicomanchean Ethics, Book III: 42) 
 
In this respect, Athannassoulis (2004) makes an important remark: 
 
Aristotle then observes that where a thing has a function the good of the thing is when it 
performs its function well. For example, the knife has a function, to cut, and it performs its 
function well when it cuts well. This argument is applied to man; man has a function and the 
good man is the man who performs his function well. Man's function is what is peculiar to him 
and sets him aside from other beings, and that activity is reason. Therefore, the function of 
man is reason and the life that is distinctive of humans is the life in accordance with reason. If 
the function of man is reason, then the good man is the man who functions well, i.e. reasons 
well, this is the life of excellence, the life of eudaimonia. This means that eudaimonia is the 
life of virtue, as virtue is activity in accordance with reason, man’s highest function. 
   12
Economics builds on the postulate that people do think, in other words, they do 
exercise their fundamental virtue of reason. In this, economics is deeply in line with the 
concept of a virtuous person (in the Aristotelian tradition). What economics teaches us is that 
people reason when making choices: they weigh up the alternatives and decide as well as 
possible. Contrary to the popular interpretation, calculation is not the result of selfish 
behaviour, but of the natural decision process of a good person. 
Of course, acting with reason is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for behaving 
well. A person with vices may be rational: the criminal may rationally choose the best method 
to carry out his immoral plans. All we want to emphasise here is that a person driven by the 
highest interest cannot be considered a virtuous person if he behaves irrationally, that is in a 
foolish way. The virtuous person cultivates all the virtues, and one of those virtues is well 
learned through economics: to act with reason. 
 
4.2. The model of man in economics:  ethical implications 
 
Nozick (1993) argues that the requirement of most efficient decision-making, what he calls 
‘instrumental rationality’, is the overwhelming guide to human action at a basic level.
12 
Economics has developed its full range of analyses on the basis of decisions taken by people 
under the banner of instrumental rationality. Although these mental processes are important, 
they do not apparently provide us with a comprehensive theory of human action. Emotions 
and instincts may also play an important role. The fact that economics studies a limited set of 
human actions does not however mean that understanding this reality is a meaningless 
exercise.
13 The fact that economics acknowledges that the individual is an optimizer does not 
mean that the goals of the individual should be simplistic or basic. While economics accepts 
the idea that a person evaluates actions and consequences according to his own references in 
order to maximize something called ‘utility’, it does not claim that the individual is or should 
be selfish, and that utility is strictly related to a personal gain. The concept of utility is very 
abstract and can accommodate very different partial goals (such as protecting animals or 
                                                 
12 He does not rule out that a higher level of rationality can guide individuals in their more substantive actions, 
and that there are bridges between the two levels of rationality. 
13 Hirschman (1981) called for a research programme where emotions become part and parcel of economic 
analyses. The task proved to be extremely difficult. See Rabin (1993) for a decision model that incorporates 
some form of emotions.   13
making a collection of mugs).
14 Economics can therefore deal with multiple objectives, 
including altruism, social status, cultural factors, environmental protection, etc. (Becker, 
1976; 1996; Hirschelfer, 1977; Altman, 2005). An individual may be a good, generous 
person, and, because of this make good use of resources by making choices based on rational 
calculations. 
Some experiments in behavioural economics have fuelled a debate on the merits or 
otherwise of economics teaching. Frank et al. (1993) claim that people educated in economics 
tend to be less cooperative in social dilemmas (strategic interactions), which might have 
morally adverse consequences. It is too early as yet to tell whether their result is robust. Yezer 
et al. (1996) contribute some evidence that it is not. 
One important topic in economics is: what is the most appropriate way to describe the 
mental processes and goals of flesh-and-blood human beings? Jensen and Meckling (2005) 
consider this issue within a comparative analysis of competing contemporary models of 
human behaviour. Two of them are relevant to our analysis: the Resourceful, Evaluative, 
Maximizing Model (REMM) and the model known as the Economic Model.
15 The REMM 
model describes the individual as an intelligent, creative being, who pursues a wide range of 
goals in the most efficient way possible. The authors argue that individuals evaluate and make 
trade-offs within a very broad range of ‘goods’, such as ‘oranges, water, air, housing, honesty 
or safety’. Many economic analyses however depict the individual as caring only about 
‘money’, or more precisely a monetary evaluation of the utility to be achieved from given 
actions. The Economic Model (or money maximizing model) therefore appears as a reductive 
version of REMM; Jensen and Meckling (2005: 90) deplore the fact that ‘while economists 
profess fidelity to REMM, their loyalty is neither universal nor constant’. 
The Economic Model is clearly not consistent with the virtue ethics approach, whereas 
REMM is. The fact that individuals can trade off ‘a little of almost anything we care to name, 
even reputation and morality, for a sufficiently large quantity of other desired things’ tells us 
nothing about the sizes of the marginal substitution rates. What the practice of virtue may 
teach the individual is that he should not give up the pursuit of higher goals, whatever the 
short-term benefit may be. The relative weights assigned to various objectives are what makes 
the difference between the virtuous and the non-virtuous man. 
 
                                                 
14 See also Hausman and McPherson (2006).   14
4.3. Rationality and imperfect information 
 
Section 2.2 underlines the revolution in economics brought about by new analyses of 
information. In this context, the concept of rationality utilized in contemporary economics by 
no means assumes that people are in possession of perfect information when they decide on 
their desired course of action. According to the new theory of expectations (the rational 
expectation hypothesis), people are assumed to do their best to form their expectations. This 
does not mean they can never be wrong. In fact since life is full of random events people will 
be wrong most of the time, but clever people will strive to make these errors as small as 
possible and try to eliminate all systematic biases (Sheffrin, 1983). Hence the new perspective 
on rationality in economics comes with a more nuanced image of the acting man, who 
struggles to understand the world where he lives, and succeeds in this endeavour. This is no 
doubt a humanist perspective on the human being, since man is assumed to be able to take 
charge of his life through reasoning. 
The new perspective on rationality was accompanied by a renewed logic of strategic 
human interactions which built on advances in Game Theory. Combined with the logic of 
imperfect information, these analyses can provide powerful explanations for contracting 
situations, rivalries and races, which all build on non-cooperative attitudes, but also ways to 
increase sharing within a cooperative framework. In so doing, economics acknowledges that 
while the individual is solely responsible for his own decisions, he may be aware of the 
consequences of his decisions for his fellow beings, and the reaction of others to his own 
actions. This opened up a path of research into analysis of trust, honesty, loyalty, and 
reputation-building which highlights the role of human values in shaping human interactions. 
In general, economists carrying out analyses of trust, honesty, fairness and altruism 
have worked within the framework of the standard model for decision-making under 
uncertainty. According to this model, set up by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern in 
the 1940s, an individual who must make a decision without knowing the exact outcome but is 
able to assess the probabilities of various possible outcomes is supposed to choose the action 
which will bring about the highest expected utility. Economists thus applied this logic in 
assessing the benefits of telling the truth, or helping others, or comparing their status with a 
control group. 
                                                                                                                                                         
15 The three others are the Sociological (or Social Victim) Model, the Psychological (or Hierarchy of Needs) 
Model and the Political (or Perfect Agent) Model.    15
In recent years, behavioural economics has pointed out several contradictions between 
the standard (von Neumann-Morgenstern) model of decision-making under uncertainty, and 
actual individual choices (in very particular cases). Some researchers concluded rather hastily 
that the concept of rationality so dear to neo-classical economists is meaningless; others 
inferred that the standard decision model should be generalized in order to account for these 
idiosyncratic reactions. As Smith (2005) notes, the first conclusion seems to be inconsistent 
with the observed domination of the planet by the human species over several millennia; he 
embraces the second view, and suggests that economists should pay more attention to the role 
of contexts in mental processes as shortcuts for decision-making. There is no doubt that 
ethical values have an important role in context definition and selection and thus should have 
a bearing on the choice of the course of action. 
One of the major strengths of neoclassical economics is its ability to incorporate 
valuable concepts from other sciences (Vranceanu, 2005). As Altman argues (2005: 752), 
‘conventional economic theory can easily accommodate altruistic, ethical, and moral 
behaviour as part of its standard rational agent maximizing framework, when such behaviour 
has no impact on the survival of the firm’. If ethical considerations become more prominent in 
practice, there is no doubt that economics will be able to provide valuable insights. In other 
words, if the business world becomes more ethical, economics will reflect this change in its 
analyses. 
 
5. Ethics and the quest for efficiency 
 
We have defined economics as the social science that analyses how scarce resources are 
allocated. In this setup, the immediate goal of economics itself is to guide human action so as 
to eliminate inefficiencies in the resource allocation process. Contemporary economics puts 
additional emphasis on the informational origin of various inefficiencies, while traditional 
economics deals essentially with material inefficiencies related to the market architecture. 
Yet waste and inefficiencies are abstract concepts. In practical terms, economists have 
long been concerned about such issues as growth and development, fighting poverty, reducing 
unemployment, stabilizing the macroeconomic and financial environment, or improving 
consumer welfare by containing firms’ market power. The moral foundation underlying their 
quest is deeply humanist – it is the duty of the social scientists to help people live as well as 
possible.   16
The important practical contribution of economics to the development of the Western 
World in the last two centuries cannot be denied. Either directly, or transposed into user-
friendly advice by management scholars, applied economic wisdom has helped eradicate 
waste in many sectors and activities and therefore sustained the economic development of the 
West. What should be emphasised here is that output growth comes with many moral and 
political benefits, clearly presented by Benjamin Friedman in a recent book. He writes: 
 
Economic growth – meaning a rising standard of living for the clear majority of citizens – 
more often than not fosters greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, 
commitment to fairness, and dedication to democracy. (Friedman, 2005: 4). 
 
The flourishing of moral values is no doubt stimulated in an environment where basic 
needs are satisfied. Many human conflicts are built on quarrels over an extremely scarce 
resource.
16 Arrow (1970: 26) states that ‘among properties of many societies whose economic 
development is backward is a lack of mutual trust’. 
So economics’ chief concern with growth and development goes far beyond a narrow-
minded goal of wealth accumulation. While economics promotes growth as an immediate 
objective, this does not imply that the ultimate goal of economics is growth itself. All good 
economists take a broad perspective on human wellbeing. What responsible person would 
seriously argue that wealth accumulation is the only thing that matters for happiness? Yet the 
problem of growth itself cannot be overemphasised. Robert Lucas, observing that some 
countries tend to grow much faster than the others for reasons not yet clearly understood, 
wrote (in 1988): 
 
‘Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead the Indian economy to 
grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, what exactly? If not, what is it about the “nature of 
India” that makes it so? The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these 
are simply staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything 
else’ (Lucas, 1988: 5) 
 
Economics is at its most useful when it has to deal with situations where the policy 
decision can make (at least) one person better off while not deteriorating anybody else’s 
                                                 
16 Empirical analyses suggest that crime is often concentrated among those living in poverty (Oxoby, 2004).   17
wellbeing. Yet in many real life situations, the solution to economic dilemmas involves trade-
offs; some persons will be better off, and others worse off as a result. In general (neoclassical) 
economics redistribution is considered as a second order problem; one should firstly bake the 
pie, then share it. The dramatic experience of centrally-planned economies is relevant in that 
respect: in those countries, the focus on fair (read egalitarian) redistribution of an ever-
shrinking pie did not bring people satisfaction, and in the end all these regimes collapsed 
under a tide of strong public unrest. Economists agree that redistributive decisions should be 
taken at a higher decision level, where social trade-offs can be exercised in keeping with the 
agreed social rules. 
In his Nicomanchean Ethics, Aristotle praised the liberal person, the man who knows 
how to give his wealth rightly: to the right people, in the right proportions and at the right 
times. By providing a rigorous theory of prices, economics sheds light on what constitute 
‘right’ or ‘excessive’ proportions. For instance, in a competitive market, the price is the right 
reward for the supplier; in other market structures, more careful analysis is needed in order to 
find out whether an abnormal producer’s margin is the ‘right’ price for innovation and risk-
taking, or is representative of an abuse of market power. 
The good person who behaves virtuously must avoid wasting resources when pursuing 
his (higher) goals. Society highly values such a person, as illustrated by a modern-day 
example. In 2000 the founder of Microsoft, Bill Gates, and his wife Melinda created a charity 
foundation. In 2006, Bill Gates decided to dedicate all his time to running this organization. 
The surprise lay in the huge flow of external resources attracted by the organization (about 
10.5 billion dollars): the generous donors said that if Bill Gates, one of the most successful 
entrepreneurs of the past century, was running the foundation, they were sure the funds would 
be utilized in the most efficient way, to the highest benefit of those who need aid.
 We trust 
efficient persons in all matters, including for helping the most disadvantaged persons. 
Economics makes a positive contribution to human development, since it teaches us how to 
manage resources in an efficient way. Again this is by no means an indication that efficiency 
alone is sufficient to define virtuous behaviour. All we are saying is that prodigality, or 
careless spending, is a vice that should be opposed by educating people to behave efficiently. 
 
6. Ethics and the principle of predetermined tastes 
 
In the 18
th century, economics and ethics were closely related. Classical economists – to 
mention only Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill or David Hume – were at least as concerned   18
about how people should behave within the economic interactions as about how these 
interactions were actually organized.
17 This normative focus required judgment regarding the 
fairness of distribution, and more generally the ultimate goals of society. 
Yet the dominant paradigm of neoclassical economics takes individuals’ tastes as 
given, in the sense that it makes no judgement on why people choose one goal or another 
(Hirschleifer, 1977; Sen, 1987). This choice was probably motivated by a concern for 
efficiency in their own analyses: economists were not yet comfortable with models where 
constraints and goals interact, given the high complexity of such structures. Since goals 
probably change only slowly over time, while constraints and incentives may vary rapidly, 
economists opted for simplification, considering goals as predetermined. Yuengert (2002: 
331) argues that this separation between ethics and economics may come with a risk: ‘If the 
researcher’s ends are separated completely from the higher ends which direct it, he will either 
substitute the goals of economics for those higher ends, or risk conducting research that has 
no intelligible principle guiding it’. 
One important question is whether the object of research in economics is determined 
by the method (assumed to be invariable), or whether the method itself can evolve so as to 
increase its analytical power over a given subject. If economics is about studying human 
choice for given tastes, the former applies, because in that case the method defines the science 
and not the reverse. But in the introduction we defined economics as a theory of rational 
human action. Changing tastes should then be seen as a worthwhile generalization of the 
given tastes paradigm. 
This idea is given stronger emphasis when placed within a virtue ethics perspective. 
As observed by Aristotle centuries ago, in the long run human action also has a bearing on 
human character. A person’s character (preferences) is the engine but also the result of the 
ongoing battle against scarcity. In other words, choices may also have a bearing on tastes, and 
not only the other way round. 
In recent years it has become only too obvious that the predetermined taste paradigm 
has reached its limits. Buchanan (1992) foresees that in the world of economic reality where 
people discover their preferences through their choices, the static (predetermined tastes) 
general equilibrium model will become less popular as a research programme, and its 
normative implications might well fade away. 
                                                 
17 For instance, during that period Adam Smith became famous for his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) well 
before writing the celebrated The Wealth of Nations (1776).   19
In order to renew their analyses, economists should become more open to ethical 
dilemmas, and try to keep in mind that proposed solutions should by no means support the 
development of unethical behaviour. They should pay more attention to situations where the 
goals themselves may change, depending on actions and beliefs. The call for such a research 
programme within the neoclassical paradigm is not new, and can be traced back at least to the 
writings of Albert Hirschman in the 1970s. Today, there is some optimism that neoclassical 
economics will address these issues adequately (Altman, 2005; Hausman and McPherson, 
2006). The embryos of such studies include analyses of addictive behaviour (inter alia, von 
Weizsäcker, 1971; Pollak, 1971; Cowen, 1989) on the interactions between social status and 
individual welfare (inter alia, Frank, 1985; Scitovsky, 1992; Cole et al., 1992; Corneo and 




In the last thirty years, the science of economics has been totally restructured, driven by the 
implementation of a research program in the economics of (imperfect) information. The 
renaissance in economics was facilitated by the progress made in its tools and methods. In 
particular, advances in game theory and statistics made it possible to extend and generalize 
the principle of rationality, for more rigorous examination of decision-making under 
uncertainty and imperfect information. 
Yet contemporary economics does not only consist of broader topics and better 
techniques. One outstanding feature of contemporary economics is a return to the ethical 
quest of the early neoclassical writers: with their modern awareness of how to analyse 
imperfect information situations, economists are beginning to focus once more on fighting 
waste, in order to contribute to improving the welfare of individuals and society. The raging 
ideological conflicts of the 1970s have almost vanished, since all economists now agree that 
imperfect information lies at the origins of most disruptions in decentralized economies, and 
that fluctuations are a built-in feature of such systems. 
By focusing on informational inefficiencies within a comprehensive research 
programme, economics has provided helpful policy recommendations, able to stabilize and 
support growth in both developed and developing economies. In turn, as Friedman (2005) 
notes, economic development is an important factor for moral development. 
By emphasizing rational decision-making, economics promotes a model of man acting 
wisely. In this context, calculative behaviour should not be seen as representative of a selfish   20
person, but a responsible and prudent one. Responsibility and prudence are important virtues 
in the Aristotelian ethical perspective. Of course, this is only one side of the story, as 
efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for appropriate action. The choice of 
the broader goals that guide one’s action is another important factor. 
Although economics has so far said little about how human goals are defined, it 
certainly does not advocate selfish and aggressive behaviour. On the contrary, most 
economists would agree that human values like trust, loyalty, honesty, fairness in dealings and 
truthfulness are very much needed to oil the wheels of the market-based economic system, 
and that reneging on those ethical values would entail major economic costs in the free 
economy.
18 What narrow-minded economist would argue against this idea? It is clear to 
everybody that unethical behaviour brings about significant long-term costs, starting with the 
loss of reputation, an important asset in the free economy. 
By taking human goals as given, economics has been able to make and is still making 
substantial progress in analysing human action. Yet human character and actions are 
interdependent. A major challenge for 21
st century economics is therefore to take into account 
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